Summary:
The title of this post refers to how Pakistani establishment (Yahya Khan on down) viewed Indira Gandhi during 1971 war. Nixon and Kissinger called her in far more juvenile terms (rhymes with ditch). That and Pakistan's reliance on the long discredited martial theory of races (championed by British - 1 Muslim soldier is equivalent to 10 Hindus) ensured a catastrophic defeat for Pakistan, an Indian victory and liberation of Bangladesh. In this book, the author argues that Indira Gandhi could have gotten her victory earlier (and saved countless more Bangladeshi lives) if she had been more aggressive when the crisis began in late 1968. In her defense, she was arrayed against 2 of the 3 major powers at that time - US and China. Soviet Union was on India's side but its support was very fidgety (as would be shown by its UN stance when India was close to capturing Dhaka). The book analyses the liberation of Bangladesh by placing it in the international context at that time - Soviet China rift on Marxism, US overtures to China (with Pakistan as intermediary), Soviet overtures to Pakistan. It is very light on the military aspects necessarily because the military action was so short and effective.
In Pakistani eyes, the liberation of Bangladesh is seen as a betrayal by Bengalis of the promise of a homeland for South Asia's Muslims. For Bangladeshis, it is their war for national liberation. For Indians, it is seen as the 3rd India Pakistan war that fatally wounded Pakistan's founding assumption - that of a nation state defined on religion (two nation theory). The author succeeds in broadening how the war is viewed, by analyzing the events during that period by its impact on a multitude of international actors (Nations, UN, cultural elite, media). Indian victory has enabled military leaders at that time (General S.H.F.J "Sam" Manekshaw, Lieutenant J.S.Aurora and Major General Jacob) to get a lions share of the credit at the expense of the political class. The reality on the ground was that it was a crisis that needed a political solution and in India, the political class put the military in a winning position (only deployed it when it was ready to fight and used it for a narrow, well defined purpose) whereas in Pakistan, the military was put in a no-win situation of addressing a political problem through military means. Because of the subsequent assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, several members of his family and Awami League's senior leadership after Bangladesh's independence, Bangladesh has now followed Pakistan into the failed state category.
For the US, the 1971 war is another illustration of how far Kissinger would go in his pursuit of the success of his grand strategy. The glowing success of Nixon's trip to China overshadowed the strategic failure of Kissinger and Nixon in reading Chinese support for Pakistan and their moral failure to stop the selective genocide of Hindus in East Pakistan. Nixon had always shown himself to be a cunning and amoral politician and his presidential tenure reflected that. It is a travesty though that Kissinger is still feted by US presidents and presidential candidates for his strategic acumen when his record shows otherwise(he is in the same boat as Mother Theresa, another leader who gets credit for prolonging human suffering in service of an illusion).
Analysis:
During my high school years, I remember reading a Tamil comic series released by Kalki magazine in the 1970's to drum up support for the Indian military during 1971 war. Because it was wartime, the characters were clearly delineated into good (India and Mukti Bahini) and bad(Pakistan). It also portrayed Tikka Khan (the Pakistan Army chief during that time) as a lecherous maniac and Yahya Khan (President of Pakistan during that time) as a drunkard. Reading this book, the portrayal of Yahya Khan is pretty close to the truth whereas Tikka Khan serves as a stand in for the atrocities perpetrated by Pakistani soldiers in Bangladesh (East Pakistan). It is also an example the coordinated approach of India in the 1971 crisis - while Indira Gandhi was insisting India was purely taking a defensive approach to the humanitarian crisis on its borders, media was playing its part in whipping up support for whatever action Indian government might decide on, and the expatriate Indian (and Bengali) community going all out to publicize the genocidal actions of Pakistan Army.
After its independence in 1947, Pakistan's ruling establishment (mainly based in West Pakistan) decidedly did not want to treat East Pakistan on an equal footing. National language of Pakistan was Urdu and requests from East Pakistanis to make Bengali an official language were shot down (starting with Jinnah). It is very instructive to contrast Pakistani and Indian approaches to the language question even though Hindu nationalists seem to be taking a page from the Pakistan handbook of mandating a single language (Hindi) across India. The untimely death of Jinnah solidified Islam as the religious foundation of Pakistan even though it is not at all clear if even Jinnah would have succeeded in fashioning Pakistan into a secular country (after having positioned himself and Muslim League as the sole spokesman of South Asian Muslims). Economically, revenue from East Pakistan jute exports served to drive industrialization of West Pakistan. The takeover of military in 1956 also ensured that the leadership in Pakistan would place a premium on the rigid view of West Pakistan as the official Pakistan with East Pakistan looked upon as a pesky danger to be dealt with (especially given the political significance of East Pakistan's demographic advantage and its influence on electoral majority). On the other hand, a civilian democratic government could have co-opted Bengali leaders in East Pakistan by accommodating them with governmental appointments.
Globally, 3 significant processes accelerated during late 1960's and early 1970's that contributed to the liberation of Bangladesh - new nations formed from erstwhile colonies after their freedom from European powers, Cold war between US and the Soviet Union and globalization. Pakistan was not an exception to student protests sweeping nations across the world during that time but in its case, those protests led to the liberation of Bangladesh. Under its dictator, Ayub Khan, Pakistan focused on growing its economy and succeeded (at least in the western portion) - it posted an average growth of 5.5% in the first 10 years of Ayub Khan's rule. Student protests broke out in East and West Pakistan over Education department changes to extend Undergraduate period of study from 2 to 3 years, tighten grading systems, provide only one opportunity for failed students to pass and expand the number of available colleges and universities. The booming private sector in Pakistan disproportionately benefited a small section of the society with the absolute number of people in poverty increasing from 8.65 milion in 1963 to 9.33 million in 1968. The student population was also far removed from the idealism of the founding generation of Pakistan. The influence of US policies in Vietnam and the spread of Rock'n Roll had its impact as well. The student protests in West Pakistan focused on increasing their stake in the future of Pakistan and were not looking to overthrow the government (especially since they were the beneficiaries of Pakistan government policies vis-a-vis East Pakistan).Student protesters in East Pakistan, seriously focused on overthrowing the government of Pakistan and the impact of their protests was also higher owing to lack of established political forces or democratic structures in East Pakistan.
After it became a mass movement in November 1968, student protests in East Pakistan operated under an umbrella organization - Student Action Committee (SAC) comprised of East Pakistan Students League (EPSL - Student arm of Awami League) and East Pakistan Students Union (EPSU - with its pro-Soviet Union and pro-China factions). The leader of Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, had started out as a student leader under the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, H S Suhrawardy. He wanted to work within the political contours of Pakistan and supported Suhrawardy's (laughable) assurances to Bengalis that the new 1956 constitution provided 98 percent autonomy to East Pakistan. He hoped to leverage the demographics of East Pakistan into an electoral majority across Pakistan. He was on trial for conspiring with Indian spies in the Agartala Conspiracy case. His contemporary in West Pakistan was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (father of Benazir Bhutto) whose political base was in Sindh province in West Pakistan. Bhutto had studied in Berkeley and Oxford and was picked by Ayub Khan to be in his cabinet upon his return to Pakistan. Bhutto was instrumental in nudging Ayub Khan towards China and also dragging Pakistan into a war with India in 1965. The Tashkent agreement to end 1965 war resulted in Bhutto going into opposition against Ayub Khan and that stance earned him a significant following among agitating students of West Pakistan. As a result of the student protests, both Bhutto and Mujib were put in jail. With the protests showing no signs of slowing down, Ayub Khan announced his decision not to stand for presidency in the next election. By February 1969, pressure on Ayub Khan to resign mounted from the Army particularly its commander in chief, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. Yahya Khan became the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator by end of March 1969. He proposed general elections to be held on October 5, 1970. The elected representatives of National Assembly would then have 120 days to draw up and adopt a constitution. If they failed to meet the deadline, National Assembly would be dissolved and fresh elections called(Putting in place short term deadlines in the hope that the deadline itself would provide incentives for finding a solution is a fool's errand as it happens repeatedly with the present day negotiations over debt ceiling by US Congress).
Bhutto campaigned almost exclusively in West Pakistan and put forward the principle of Islamic Socialism - appealing to religious sensibilities of people while championing the poor. He was also duplicitous - he assured the protesting students of his intention to pull out of Pakistan's existing alliances with the West while promising the Western nations that he planned to do no such thing. The parties in East Pakistan were Awami League under Mujib and the communist National Awami Party that then split into pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet parties. Mujib campaigned on the promise of more autonomy for East Pakistan within the existing constitution of Pakistan and promised to uphold the unity and integrity of Pakistan. During the election campaign, floods devastated East Pakistan in July 1970. As a result, Yahya Khan postponed the elections to December 1970. He also underestimated the damage caused by the floods (partly because he was inebriated when doing a tour of flood affected areas) and as a result, Pakistan government was slow to respond to the humanitarian disaster. That pushed Mujib towards calling for independence. He still hoped to do well in the elections so he did not advocate secession from Pakistan.
When the election results came out, it was a surprise to Pakistani military as well as Mujib. Awami League had won 160 out of 162 seats in East Pakistan. Pakistan Peoples Party (Bhutto's Party) won 81 out of the 138 seats in West Pakistan. With such a commanding majority, Awami League expected Yahya Khan to call Mujib to form his government. Yahya Khan and the military dictatorship had expected Awami League to do worse and PPP to do better and use the parity in seats to drag out the Constitution drafting process beyond 120 days, thereby strengthening its hold on power. PPP had won significant number of seats in Punjab which is where the military recruited its soldiers. Yahya Khan met with Bhutto and Mujib. Mujib envisioned a ceremonial role for Yahya whereas Yahya Khan expected to be in charge of consequential ministries (Defense, Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Interior, Communications). With no consensus between Yahya, Mujib and Bhutto, Yahya Khan decided to postpone the National Assembly to March 3, 1971. On March 1, Yahya Khan informed Mujib that the National Assembly was being postponed again. As a result, people in East Pakistan came out in droves to protest. Mujib announced he would address a rally on March 7 in Dhaka. On March 6, Yahya Khan announced that talks with Awami League had broken down and National Assembly would open on March 25. He had also kept the Pakistani Army on high alert and ready to go. In the meantime, Bhutto put forth an offer by which PPP would govern West Pakistan and Awami League would govern East Pakistan ('Idhar hum, Udhar tum') - pretty much bypassing people's will. Mujib was under pressure from the student leadership to declare complete independence and was trying his utmost to keep Pakistan together. Yahya decided on 23 March that Pakistan military would go into East Pakistan to put down the protests and restore order. He signed off on the military action and Operation Searchlight began at 11:30 PM on 25 March 1971.
Pakistan Army moved quickly and arrested Mujib but the rest of the student movement and Awami League senior leadership escaped, into nearby forests or over the border into India. The swift action by Pakistani military focused on bringing Dhaka under its control and it was able to do that, albeit using targeted killings of Hindus and students. US consulate in Dhaka protested Pakistan Army's actions and raised it with Nixon and Kissinger, calling it a genocide (detailed in the book Blood Telegram and national security archives of George Washington University). Pakistani Army was not able to corral some battalions of East Pakistan regiment and East Pakistan Rifles. They resisted Pakistani Army's control of Dhaka and reached out to Indian soldiers across the border to request support. The senior political leadership of Awami League also succeeded in evading Pakistani Army and made its way across the Indian border.
In 1969, Indira Gandhi split the Congress Party into Congress (O) and Congress (R). Congress (R) later became Congress (I). Indira Gandhi called for National elections with Congress (I) on one side and Congress (O), Jana Sangh, Swatantra Party, Socialists and regional parties on the other side. To counter the opposition's slogan of 'Indira Hatao' (Drive Indira Out), Indira Gandhi campaigned under the slogan 'Garibi Hatao'(Drive Poverty Out).Congress (I) captured 352 of 518 seats and formed a majority government. With the elections behind her, Indira Gandhi turned her focus to the East Pakistan crisis. When Awami League swept East Pakistan, India hoped to use it to achieve peace (since Awami League was secular in nature). Even though India has taken credit for liberating Bangladesh, during the crisis, Indira and her advisers were very cautious (sometimes overly cautious) about not getting into a fight over East Pakistan crisis. They had good reasons for the cautious approach from the failure of Biafran rebellion in Nigeria some years earlier and concluded that independence of Bangladesh hinged on the rebels' success. However, they did not move forward with arming rebels so they could be successful. To their credit, the senior leadership of Awami League tried their utmost to convince India of the support they needed (even presenting themselves as representatives of the new government of Bangladesh even though no one, not even India, had officially recognized them). Senior leadership of Awami League also formed an interim government under Syed Nazrul Islam in front of Indian and foreign media just across from Indian border. Indira Gandhi's extreme reluctance to recognize Bangladesh or engage in aggressive posturing is in direct contrast to the apocryphal stories told about Indian military leaders keeping a check on Indira Gandhi's aggressiveness during the liberation of Bangladesh (One story has General Manekshaw telling Indira Gandhi upon her demand for a military solution to East Pakistan crisis that "If you still want me to go ahead, Prime Minister, I guarantee you 100 percent defeat. Now give me your orders"). In Indira Gandhi's estimation, the weaknesses of Indian Army that showed up during 1965 war had not been rectified and the army would be caught with its pants down if Pakistan attacked the Western front to keep Indian forces pinned down. She was also worried about China getting into a fight with India on the side of Pakistan. She was not confident of the political skills of Awami League to manage a transition into an independent country, with Mujib in jail. She wanted to support East Pakistan resistance just enough so they did not collapse under Pakistan Army's relentless pressure. She wanted to wait till November when the passes in Himalayas would be covered in snow that would make it difficult for Chinese to rush reinforcements to their Pakistani allies.
She was however forced to move away from her cautious approach by the massive influx of refugees (May 1971 saw an average daily influx of 102,000) that were pouring over the border with East Pakistan. From 1947, the proportion of refugees from East Pakistan had been 80% Muslim and 20% Hindu, in line with the population distribution in East Pakistan. With the onset of the crisis, the proportion switched to 80% Hindu and 20% Muslim, due to targeted killing engaged by Pakistani Army. The refugee influx allowed Indira Gandhi to mount a persuasive case that the internal problem of Pakistan had now become an internal problem for India as well. Politically, it hamstrung her from rolling out her socialist agenda as the funds were diverted to refugee assistance. She continued to request the world powers to pressure Pakistan to find a political solution to the crisis.
Richard Nixon was the president of US and Henry Kissinger his National Security Adviser during this period. The united facade of Marxist communist bloc had cracked when China and Soviet Union fought each other in 1969 near Ussuri river. United States hoped to pry China away from the Soviet Union. As part of its grand strategy (that culminated in Nixon's visit to China), Kissinger and Nixon used Yahya Khan to serve as the go-between for their feelers towards Chinese. When Chinese cautiously responded to US overtures, Kissinger and Nixon went all in. This enabled Yahya Khan to play an outsize role in American foreign policy and also have US turn a blind eye to the genocidal actions of Pakistani military during the war. Even though Kissinger was opposed by the US State Department, Kissinger and Nixon steadfastly backed Yahya in the hope their embrace of China would bear fruit. Nixon and Kissinger had natural antipathy for India (because of non-alignment) in general and Indira Gandhi in particular. In stark contrast, Kissinger and Nixon thought Yahya Khan was a stand up guy in a tough spot. Even when other countries took a cautious stance on Pakistani Army's depradations in East Pakistan, Kissinger and Nixon held out hope that a military solution to East Pakistan crisis, favorable to Pakistan, would make the whole issue moot. To that end, they lifted the arms embargo on Pakistan in place after 1965 war over State Department objections(and after receiving increasingly specific telegrams from Archer Blood, the US Consul in Dhaka, about selective genocide being carried out by the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan).
The East Pakistan crisis was having a deleterious impact on Pakistan's economy with its foreign exchange reserves standing at $137.4 million dollars as of April 1971. The donor countries insisted that Pakistan find a political solution to the East Pakistan crisis before providing new aid (even though they did not place any restrictions on existing aid). In May 1971, Pakistan announced a moratorium on debt which further complicated matters for the donor countries extending more aid. With Pakistan economy in dire straits, Kissinger and Nixon leaned on World Bank and IMF to extend more economic assistance to Pakistan. In a clear sign of which side they were hoping would come out the winner, US warned India that in a war between India and Pakistan, if China decided to interfere, US would stand on the sidelines and not counter China. To counter the heavy tilt of China and US towards Pakistan, India looked to the Soviet Union.
Soviet Union and India signed a treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971 that enjoined both countries to come to the other country's aid if one of them was attacked by a third country. This was a departure for the Soviet Union as it had recently started warming up to Pakistan in military sales after the 1965 war. The support that Soviet Union provided to India was more qualified compared to US support for Pakistan - Soviet Union wanted Pakistan to find a political solution to the East Pakistan crisis but at the same time, it cautioned India against any escalation. Soviet Union support for India was primarily meant to ward off any designs Chinese might have in case of an India Pakistan war(which had its intended effect when China stepped back from intervening in the crisis and restricted themselves to issuing statements about Peace). To that effect, it promised to help India by massing Soviet troops on Chinese border if China assisted Pakistan during the war. Chinese armed forces readiness was also hobbled by madman Mao's witch hunt of his defense minister, Lin Biao in late 1971. The genocide in East Pakistan got international exposure
primarily through the media, cultural icons and Bengali expatriate community. Pandit Ravishankar, a Bengali himself, helped to rope in the Beatles and other luminaries of the music scene to conduct a concert for Bangladesh. The media coverage of the genocide also played a big part in convincing the Bengali expatriate community to withhold their remittances to Pakistan economy, impacting it severely. Indian government, on the other hand, returned empty handed when its allies in the Middle East declined to support India's case and in case of Iran, agreed to provide air cover for Pakistan over Karachi in case of an air war between Pakistan and India. Western NGOs on the ground had a much more realistic picture of the devastating refugee crisis than their respective governments. The pressure from media, cultural elites and NGOs helped sway public opinion in Europe. In the UN, Pakistan was pretty effective at painting the whole crisis as an internal issue, with India's demands to address the refugee crisis within its borders going nowhere. Canada steadfastly refused to pressure Pakistan because of its own secession issues with Quebec, fearing accusations of hypocrisy. Golda Meir offered Israeli support to India in return for recognition of Israel but was ignored.
The refugee crisis crowded out any space for programs and initiatives Indira Gandhi had planned and the instability it was causing on India's eastern border forced Indira Gandhi to start actively supporting East Pakistan rebels. India started arming and training the Mukti Bahini in a more comprehensive manner and Pakistan inadvertently played into its hands by announcing the trial for Mujib on treason charges. In one final push to find a political solution, Indira Gandhi toured Western capitals to pressure their leaders to address East Pakistan crisis. When their responses were not satisfactory, she ordered the Indian Army to attack Pakistani border posts 10 miles inside East Pakistan. By late November 1971, Indian troops were well inside East Pakistan, holding ground and assisting Mukti Bahini fighters. The war on the Western front of India started when Pakistan attacked Punjab on 3 December 1971. While Indian analysts use this to paint Pakistan as the aggressor in the 1971 war, India was already deeply enmeshed by that time in providing military assistance to East Pakistan rebels in Pakistan territory so the war ultimately was kicked off by India.
General Manekshaw's strategy called for Indian forces to focus on getting control of major ports of Chittagong and Khulna and then split the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan into manageable groups which would then be mopped up by the Indian Army. Capturing Dhaka did not figure into their plans as it was deemed too ambitious. Major General Jacob, Chief of Staff to the Eastern Army Commander, J.S.Aurora disagreed and drew up a plan that would have the Indian Army aim straight for Dhaka. While the war was raging on, US introduced a resolution in UN Security Council calling for cessation of hostilities and requesting India and Pakistan to pull back. That resolution was vetoed by Soviet Union. However, some time later, UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly calling on India and Pakistan to accept a ceasefire and withdraw their forces from each other's territory. Nixon and Kissinger, based on information from a faulty CIA source, thought that India was planning on using the war to liberate Bangladesh, incorporate southern regions of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir into India and crush Pakistan's military might. This has been proven erroneous from transcripts of cabinet meetings chaired by Indira Gandhi during the war. In their desperation to save Yahya Khan from his own mistakes and also to show their unwavering support for an ally (mainly to impress upon the Chinese that US could be a reliable ally), Nixon and Kissinger sounded out Middle Eastern countries about serving as a conduit to supplying arms to Pakistan from US and also requested if China would consider militarily engaging India to divert pressure off Pakistan. When Chinese demurred, Nixon and Kissinger ordered US Chief of Naval Operations to move Task Group 74 (that included the largest aircraft carrier US had at that time, USS Enterprise) from waters around South Vietnam towards Bay of Bengal, as a show of intimidation towards India. When the US naval moves became public knowledge, Soviet Union panicked and arm twisted India to come to the bargaining table. With pressure mounting, India realized that only a successful capture of Dhaka would ensure independence of Bangladesh. They shifted all their resources in the dash towards Dhaka. The Pakistani commander in Dhaka, A.K.Niazi played for time (in the hope that UN would step in and prevent the wholesale surrender of Pakistan Army in East Pakistan) when General Manekshaw gave an ultimatum for the surrender of Pakistan Army by 4 PM IST on 16 December. At 4:55 PM IST on 16 December 1971, Lieutinant J.S. Aurora and General A.K.Niazi signed the Instrument of Surrender. India immediately announced an immediate and unilateral ceasefire on the Western front. After the humiliating defeat, Yahya Khan and the military handed over power in West Pakistan to Bhutto who became the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. On January 7 1972, Bhutto released Mujib who then flew to London and then to New Delhi to be received by Indira Gandhi on the tarmac. The post war conference in Shimla provided a way for India and Pakistan to solve their disputes in a bilateral fashion without external intervention and convert the ceasefire line in Kashmir (at that time) to a Line of Control that would in the future become an International border. In January 1972, the interim government of Bangladesh announced the creation of Genocide Investigation Commission and placed more than 37,000 individuals under arrest. In November 1973, Mujib announced a general amnesty for all prisoners with the exception of those charged with heinous crimes (rape, arson, murder). On August 15 1975, Mujib and several of his family members were assassinated. A week later, high ranking senior leadership of Awami League was gunned down. The interim President of Bangladesh pardoned the killers and after some time, was deposed by Major Zia Ur Rahman. In 2013, Mujib's daughter, Sheikh Hasina put into motion the trial for all those charged with crimes against humanity in 1971 (most of whom were members of Jamaat-i-Islami). The leader of opposition is Khaleda Zia, the wife of Major Zia Ur Rahman.
The story of 1971 war is the story of Indira Gandhi coming of age as a world leader in her own right. In domestic politics, she crushed the old guard of Congress party who dismissed her as lightweight, only to see the entire Congress party remade in her image. Then, it was the turn of Pakistan and the US to dismiss her as a woman in so many colorful words. Even Indian generals who should have known better (General Manekshaw, Major General Jacob) puffed themselves up as the decision makers at her expense. In the end, she steered India through a perilous period, assisted by self-inflicted wounds of Yahya Khan and Bhutto. The accolades went to her head and within 5 years, she had promulgated the Emergency across India and arrested the same political leader, Jaya Prakash Narayan, who played an instrumental role in bringing the plight of Bengalis in East Pakistan to her attention earlier.
Other Books for Reference:
The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide by Gary J Bass
The Trial of Henry Kissinger - Chritstopher Hitchens
The Trials of Henry Kissinger - Eugene Jarecki
The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 - Edited by Sajit Gandhi - National Security Archives, George Washington University
The title of this post refers to how Pakistani establishment (Yahya Khan on down) viewed Indira Gandhi during 1971 war. Nixon and Kissinger called her in far more juvenile terms (rhymes with ditch). That and Pakistan's reliance on the long discredited martial theory of races (championed by British - 1 Muslim soldier is equivalent to 10 Hindus) ensured a catastrophic defeat for Pakistan, an Indian victory and liberation of Bangladesh. In this book, the author argues that Indira Gandhi could have gotten her victory earlier (and saved countless more Bangladeshi lives) if she had been more aggressive when the crisis began in late 1968. In her defense, she was arrayed against 2 of the 3 major powers at that time - US and China. Soviet Union was on India's side but its support was very fidgety (as would be shown by its UN stance when India was close to capturing Dhaka). The book analyses the liberation of Bangladesh by placing it in the international context at that time - Soviet China rift on Marxism, US overtures to China (with Pakistan as intermediary), Soviet overtures to Pakistan. It is very light on the military aspects necessarily because the military action was so short and effective.
In Pakistani eyes, the liberation of Bangladesh is seen as a betrayal by Bengalis of the promise of a homeland for South Asia's Muslims. For Bangladeshis, it is their war for national liberation. For Indians, it is seen as the 3rd India Pakistan war that fatally wounded Pakistan's founding assumption - that of a nation state defined on religion (two nation theory). The author succeeds in broadening how the war is viewed, by analyzing the events during that period by its impact on a multitude of international actors (Nations, UN, cultural elite, media). Indian victory has enabled military leaders at that time (General S.H.F.J "Sam" Manekshaw, Lieutenant J.S.Aurora and Major General Jacob) to get a lions share of the credit at the expense of the political class. The reality on the ground was that it was a crisis that needed a political solution and in India, the political class put the military in a winning position (only deployed it when it was ready to fight and used it for a narrow, well defined purpose) whereas in Pakistan, the military was put in a no-win situation of addressing a political problem through military means. Because of the subsequent assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, several members of his family and Awami League's senior leadership after Bangladesh's independence, Bangladesh has now followed Pakistan into the failed state category.
For the US, the 1971 war is another illustration of how far Kissinger would go in his pursuit of the success of his grand strategy. The glowing success of Nixon's trip to China overshadowed the strategic failure of Kissinger and Nixon in reading Chinese support for Pakistan and their moral failure to stop the selective genocide of Hindus in East Pakistan. Nixon had always shown himself to be a cunning and amoral politician and his presidential tenure reflected that. It is a travesty though that Kissinger is still feted by US presidents and presidential candidates for his strategic acumen when his record shows otherwise(he is in the same boat as Mother Theresa, another leader who gets credit for prolonging human suffering in service of an illusion).
Analysis:
During my high school years, I remember reading a Tamil comic series released by Kalki magazine in the 1970's to drum up support for the Indian military during 1971 war. Because it was wartime, the characters were clearly delineated into good (India and Mukti Bahini) and bad(Pakistan). It also portrayed Tikka Khan (the Pakistan Army chief during that time) as a lecherous maniac and Yahya Khan (President of Pakistan during that time) as a drunkard. Reading this book, the portrayal of Yahya Khan is pretty close to the truth whereas Tikka Khan serves as a stand in for the atrocities perpetrated by Pakistani soldiers in Bangladesh (East Pakistan). It is also an example the coordinated approach of India in the 1971 crisis - while Indira Gandhi was insisting India was purely taking a defensive approach to the humanitarian crisis on its borders, media was playing its part in whipping up support for whatever action Indian government might decide on, and the expatriate Indian (and Bengali) community going all out to publicize the genocidal actions of Pakistan Army.
After its independence in 1947, Pakistan's ruling establishment (mainly based in West Pakistan) decidedly did not want to treat East Pakistan on an equal footing. National language of Pakistan was Urdu and requests from East Pakistanis to make Bengali an official language were shot down (starting with Jinnah). It is very instructive to contrast Pakistani and Indian approaches to the language question even though Hindu nationalists seem to be taking a page from the Pakistan handbook of mandating a single language (Hindi) across India. The untimely death of Jinnah solidified Islam as the religious foundation of Pakistan even though it is not at all clear if even Jinnah would have succeeded in fashioning Pakistan into a secular country (after having positioned himself and Muslim League as the sole spokesman of South Asian Muslims). Economically, revenue from East Pakistan jute exports served to drive industrialization of West Pakistan. The takeover of military in 1956 also ensured that the leadership in Pakistan would place a premium on the rigid view of West Pakistan as the official Pakistan with East Pakistan looked upon as a pesky danger to be dealt with (especially given the political significance of East Pakistan's demographic advantage and its influence on electoral majority). On the other hand, a civilian democratic government could have co-opted Bengali leaders in East Pakistan by accommodating them with governmental appointments.
Globally, 3 significant processes accelerated during late 1960's and early 1970's that contributed to the liberation of Bangladesh - new nations formed from erstwhile colonies after their freedom from European powers, Cold war between US and the Soviet Union and globalization. Pakistan was not an exception to student protests sweeping nations across the world during that time but in its case, those protests led to the liberation of Bangladesh. Under its dictator, Ayub Khan, Pakistan focused on growing its economy and succeeded (at least in the western portion) - it posted an average growth of 5.5% in the first 10 years of Ayub Khan's rule. Student protests broke out in East and West Pakistan over Education department changes to extend Undergraduate period of study from 2 to 3 years, tighten grading systems, provide only one opportunity for failed students to pass and expand the number of available colleges and universities. The booming private sector in Pakistan disproportionately benefited a small section of the society with the absolute number of people in poverty increasing from 8.65 milion in 1963 to 9.33 million in 1968. The student population was also far removed from the idealism of the founding generation of Pakistan. The influence of US policies in Vietnam and the spread of Rock'n Roll had its impact as well. The student protests in West Pakistan focused on increasing their stake in the future of Pakistan and were not looking to overthrow the government (especially since they were the beneficiaries of Pakistan government policies vis-a-vis East Pakistan).Student protesters in East Pakistan, seriously focused on overthrowing the government of Pakistan and the impact of their protests was also higher owing to lack of established political forces or democratic structures in East Pakistan.
After it became a mass movement in November 1968, student protests in East Pakistan operated under an umbrella organization - Student Action Committee (SAC) comprised of East Pakistan Students League (EPSL - Student arm of Awami League) and East Pakistan Students Union (EPSU - with its pro-Soviet Union and pro-China factions). The leader of Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, had started out as a student leader under the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, H S Suhrawardy. He wanted to work within the political contours of Pakistan and supported Suhrawardy's (laughable) assurances to Bengalis that the new 1956 constitution provided 98 percent autonomy to East Pakistan. He hoped to leverage the demographics of East Pakistan into an electoral majority across Pakistan. He was on trial for conspiring with Indian spies in the Agartala Conspiracy case. His contemporary in West Pakistan was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (father of Benazir Bhutto) whose political base was in Sindh province in West Pakistan. Bhutto had studied in Berkeley and Oxford and was picked by Ayub Khan to be in his cabinet upon his return to Pakistan. Bhutto was instrumental in nudging Ayub Khan towards China and also dragging Pakistan into a war with India in 1965. The Tashkent agreement to end 1965 war resulted in Bhutto going into opposition against Ayub Khan and that stance earned him a significant following among agitating students of West Pakistan. As a result of the student protests, both Bhutto and Mujib were put in jail. With the protests showing no signs of slowing down, Ayub Khan announced his decision not to stand for presidency in the next election. By February 1969, pressure on Ayub Khan to resign mounted from the Army particularly its commander in chief, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. Yahya Khan became the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator by end of March 1969. He proposed general elections to be held on October 5, 1970. The elected representatives of National Assembly would then have 120 days to draw up and adopt a constitution. If they failed to meet the deadline, National Assembly would be dissolved and fresh elections called(Putting in place short term deadlines in the hope that the deadline itself would provide incentives for finding a solution is a fool's errand as it happens repeatedly with the present day negotiations over debt ceiling by US Congress).
Bhutto campaigned almost exclusively in West Pakistan and put forward the principle of Islamic Socialism - appealing to religious sensibilities of people while championing the poor. He was also duplicitous - he assured the protesting students of his intention to pull out of Pakistan's existing alliances with the West while promising the Western nations that he planned to do no such thing. The parties in East Pakistan were Awami League under Mujib and the communist National Awami Party that then split into pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet parties. Mujib campaigned on the promise of more autonomy for East Pakistan within the existing constitution of Pakistan and promised to uphold the unity and integrity of Pakistan. During the election campaign, floods devastated East Pakistan in July 1970. As a result, Yahya Khan postponed the elections to December 1970. He also underestimated the damage caused by the floods (partly because he was inebriated when doing a tour of flood affected areas) and as a result, Pakistan government was slow to respond to the humanitarian disaster. That pushed Mujib towards calling for independence. He still hoped to do well in the elections so he did not advocate secession from Pakistan.
When the election results came out, it was a surprise to Pakistani military as well as Mujib. Awami League had won 160 out of 162 seats in East Pakistan. Pakistan Peoples Party (Bhutto's Party) won 81 out of the 138 seats in West Pakistan. With such a commanding majority, Awami League expected Yahya Khan to call Mujib to form his government. Yahya Khan and the military dictatorship had expected Awami League to do worse and PPP to do better and use the parity in seats to drag out the Constitution drafting process beyond 120 days, thereby strengthening its hold on power. PPP had won significant number of seats in Punjab which is where the military recruited its soldiers. Yahya Khan met with Bhutto and Mujib. Mujib envisioned a ceremonial role for Yahya whereas Yahya Khan expected to be in charge of consequential ministries (Defense, Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Interior, Communications). With no consensus between Yahya, Mujib and Bhutto, Yahya Khan decided to postpone the National Assembly to March 3, 1971. On March 1, Yahya Khan informed Mujib that the National Assembly was being postponed again. As a result, people in East Pakistan came out in droves to protest. Mujib announced he would address a rally on March 7 in Dhaka. On March 6, Yahya Khan announced that talks with Awami League had broken down and National Assembly would open on March 25. He had also kept the Pakistani Army on high alert and ready to go. In the meantime, Bhutto put forth an offer by which PPP would govern West Pakistan and Awami League would govern East Pakistan ('Idhar hum, Udhar tum') - pretty much bypassing people's will. Mujib was under pressure from the student leadership to declare complete independence and was trying his utmost to keep Pakistan together. Yahya decided on 23 March that Pakistan military would go into East Pakistan to put down the protests and restore order. He signed off on the military action and Operation Searchlight began at 11:30 PM on 25 March 1971.
Pakistan Army moved quickly and arrested Mujib but the rest of the student movement and Awami League senior leadership escaped, into nearby forests or over the border into India. The swift action by Pakistani military focused on bringing Dhaka under its control and it was able to do that, albeit using targeted killings of Hindus and students. US consulate in Dhaka protested Pakistan Army's actions and raised it with Nixon and Kissinger, calling it a genocide (detailed in the book Blood Telegram and national security archives of George Washington University). Pakistani Army was not able to corral some battalions of East Pakistan regiment and East Pakistan Rifles. They resisted Pakistani Army's control of Dhaka and reached out to Indian soldiers across the border to request support. The senior political leadership of Awami League also succeeded in evading Pakistani Army and made its way across the Indian border.
In 1969, Indira Gandhi split the Congress Party into Congress (O) and Congress (R). Congress (R) later became Congress (I). Indira Gandhi called for National elections with Congress (I) on one side and Congress (O), Jana Sangh, Swatantra Party, Socialists and regional parties on the other side. To counter the opposition's slogan of 'Indira Hatao' (Drive Indira Out), Indira Gandhi campaigned under the slogan 'Garibi Hatao'(Drive Poverty Out).Congress (I) captured 352 of 518 seats and formed a majority government. With the elections behind her, Indira Gandhi turned her focus to the East Pakistan crisis. When Awami League swept East Pakistan, India hoped to use it to achieve peace (since Awami League was secular in nature). Even though India has taken credit for liberating Bangladesh, during the crisis, Indira and her advisers were very cautious (sometimes overly cautious) about not getting into a fight over East Pakistan crisis. They had good reasons for the cautious approach from the failure of Biafran rebellion in Nigeria some years earlier and concluded that independence of Bangladesh hinged on the rebels' success. However, they did not move forward with arming rebels so they could be successful. To their credit, the senior leadership of Awami League tried their utmost to convince India of the support they needed (even presenting themselves as representatives of the new government of Bangladesh even though no one, not even India, had officially recognized them). Senior leadership of Awami League also formed an interim government under Syed Nazrul Islam in front of Indian and foreign media just across from Indian border. Indira Gandhi's extreme reluctance to recognize Bangladesh or engage in aggressive posturing is in direct contrast to the apocryphal stories told about Indian military leaders keeping a check on Indira Gandhi's aggressiveness during the liberation of Bangladesh (One story has General Manekshaw telling Indira Gandhi upon her demand for a military solution to East Pakistan crisis that "If you still want me to go ahead, Prime Minister, I guarantee you 100 percent defeat. Now give me your orders"). In Indira Gandhi's estimation, the weaknesses of Indian Army that showed up during 1965 war had not been rectified and the army would be caught with its pants down if Pakistan attacked the Western front to keep Indian forces pinned down. She was also worried about China getting into a fight with India on the side of Pakistan. She was not confident of the political skills of Awami League to manage a transition into an independent country, with Mujib in jail. She wanted to support East Pakistan resistance just enough so they did not collapse under Pakistan Army's relentless pressure. She wanted to wait till November when the passes in Himalayas would be covered in snow that would make it difficult for Chinese to rush reinforcements to their Pakistani allies.
She was however forced to move away from her cautious approach by the massive influx of refugees (May 1971 saw an average daily influx of 102,000) that were pouring over the border with East Pakistan. From 1947, the proportion of refugees from East Pakistan had been 80% Muslim and 20% Hindu, in line with the population distribution in East Pakistan. With the onset of the crisis, the proportion switched to 80% Hindu and 20% Muslim, due to targeted killing engaged by Pakistani Army. The refugee influx allowed Indira Gandhi to mount a persuasive case that the internal problem of Pakistan had now become an internal problem for India as well. Politically, it hamstrung her from rolling out her socialist agenda as the funds were diverted to refugee assistance. She continued to request the world powers to pressure Pakistan to find a political solution to the crisis.
Richard Nixon was the president of US and Henry Kissinger his National Security Adviser during this period. The united facade of Marxist communist bloc had cracked when China and Soviet Union fought each other in 1969 near Ussuri river. United States hoped to pry China away from the Soviet Union. As part of its grand strategy (that culminated in Nixon's visit to China), Kissinger and Nixon used Yahya Khan to serve as the go-between for their feelers towards Chinese. When Chinese cautiously responded to US overtures, Kissinger and Nixon went all in. This enabled Yahya Khan to play an outsize role in American foreign policy and also have US turn a blind eye to the genocidal actions of Pakistani military during the war. Even though Kissinger was opposed by the US State Department, Kissinger and Nixon steadfastly backed Yahya in the hope their embrace of China would bear fruit. Nixon and Kissinger had natural antipathy for India (because of non-alignment) in general and Indira Gandhi in particular. In stark contrast, Kissinger and Nixon thought Yahya Khan was a stand up guy in a tough spot. Even when other countries took a cautious stance on Pakistani Army's depradations in East Pakistan, Kissinger and Nixon held out hope that a military solution to East Pakistan crisis, favorable to Pakistan, would make the whole issue moot. To that end, they lifted the arms embargo on Pakistan in place after 1965 war over State Department objections(and after receiving increasingly specific telegrams from Archer Blood, the US Consul in Dhaka, about selective genocide being carried out by the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan).
The East Pakistan crisis was having a deleterious impact on Pakistan's economy with its foreign exchange reserves standing at $137.4 million dollars as of April 1971. The donor countries insisted that Pakistan find a political solution to the East Pakistan crisis before providing new aid (even though they did not place any restrictions on existing aid). In May 1971, Pakistan announced a moratorium on debt which further complicated matters for the donor countries extending more aid. With Pakistan economy in dire straits, Kissinger and Nixon leaned on World Bank and IMF to extend more economic assistance to Pakistan. In a clear sign of which side they were hoping would come out the winner, US warned India that in a war between India and Pakistan, if China decided to interfere, US would stand on the sidelines and not counter China. To counter the heavy tilt of China and US towards Pakistan, India looked to the Soviet Union.
Soviet Union and India signed a treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971 that enjoined both countries to come to the other country's aid if one of them was attacked by a third country. This was a departure for the Soviet Union as it had recently started warming up to Pakistan in military sales after the 1965 war. The support that Soviet Union provided to India was more qualified compared to US support for Pakistan - Soviet Union wanted Pakistan to find a political solution to the East Pakistan crisis but at the same time, it cautioned India against any escalation. Soviet Union support for India was primarily meant to ward off any designs Chinese might have in case of an India Pakistan war(which had its intended effect when China stepped back from intervening in the crisis and restricted themselves to issuing statements about Peace). To that effect, it promised to help India by massing Soviet troops on Chinese border if China assisted Pakistan during the war. Chinese armed forces readiness was also hobbled by madman Mao's witch hunt of his defense minister, Lin Biao in late 1971. The genocide in East Pakistan got international exposure
primarily through the media, cultural icons and Bengali expatriate community. Pandit Ravishankar, a Bengali himself, helped to rope in the Beatles and other luminaries of the music scene to conduct a concert for Bangladesh. The media coverage of the genocide also played a big part in convincing the Bengali expatriate community to withhold their remittances to Pakistan economy, impacting it severely. Indian government, on the other hand, returned empty handed when its allies in the Middle East declined to support India's case and in case of Iran, agreed to provide air cover for Pakistan over Karachi in case of an air war between Pakistan and India. Western NGOs on the ground had a much more realistic picture of the devastating refugee crisis than their respective governments. The pressure from media, cultural elites and NGOs helped sway public opinion in Europe. In the UN, Pakistan was pretty effective at painting the whole crisis as an internal issue, with India's demands to address the refugee crisis within its borders going nowhere. Canada steadfastly refused to pressure Pakistan because of its own secession issues with Quebec, fearing accusations of hypocrisy. Golda Meir offered Israeli support to India in return for recognition of Israel but was ignored.
The refugee crisis crowded out any space for programs and initiatives Indira Gandhi had planned and the instability it was causing on India's eastern border forced Indira Gandhi to start actively supporting East Pakistan rebels. India started arming and training the Mukti Bahini in a more comprehensive manner and Pakistan inadvertently played into its hands by announcing the trial for Mujib on treason charges. In one final push to find a political solution, Indira Gandhi toured Western capitals to pressure their leaders to address East Pakistan crisis. When their responses were not satisfactory, she ordered the Indian Army to attack Pakistani border posts 10 miles inside East Pakistan. By late November 1971, Indian troops were well inside East Pakistan, holding ground and assisting Mukti Bahini fighters. The war on the Western front of India started when Pakistan attacked Punjab on 3 December 1971. While Indian analysts use this to paint Pakistan as the aggressor in the 1971 war, India was already deeply enmeshed by that time in providing military assistance to East Pakistan rebels in Pakistan territory so the war ultimately was kicked off by India.
General Manekshaw's strategy called for Indian forces to focus on getting control of major ports of Chittagong and Khulna and then split the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan into manageable groups which would then be mopped up by the Indian Army. Capturing Dhaka did not figure into their plans as it was deemed too ambitious. Major General Jacob, Chief of Staff to the Eastern Army Commander, J.S.Aurora disagreed and drew up a plan that would have the Indian Army aim straight for Dhaka. While the war was raging on, US introduced a resolution in UN Security Council calling for cessation of hostilities and requesting India and Pakistan to pull back. That resolution was vetoed by Soviet Union. However, some time later, UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly calling on India and Pakistan to accept a ceasefire and withdraw their forces from each other's territory. Nixon and Kissinger, based on information from a faulty CIA source, thought that India was planning on using the war to liberate Bangladesh, incorporate southern regions of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir into India and crush Pakistan's military might. This has been proven erroneous from transcripts of cabinet meetings chaired by Indira Gandhi during the war. In their desperation to save Yahya Khan from his own mistakes and also to show their unwavering support for an ally (mainly to impress upon the Chinese that US could be a reliable ally), Nixon and Kissinger sounded out Middle Eastern countries about serving as a conduit to supplying arms to Pakistan from US and also requested if China would consider militarily engaging India to divert pressure off Pakistan. When Chinese demurred, Nixon and Kissinger ordered US Chief of Naval Operations to move Task Group 74 (that included the largest aircraft carrier US had at that time, USS Enterprise) from waters around South Vietnam towards Bay of Bengal, as a show of intimidation towards India. When the US naval moves became public knowledge, Soviet Union panicked and arm twisted India to come to the bargaining table. With pressure mounting, India realized that only a successful capture of Dhaka would ensure independence of Bangladesh. They shifted all their resources in the dash towards Dhaka. The Pakistani commander in Dhaka, A.K.Niazi played for time (in the hope that UN would step in and prevent the wholesale surrender of Pakistan Army in East Pakistan) when General Manekshaw gave an ultimatum for the surrender of Pakistan Army by 4 PM IST on 16 December. At 4:55 PM IST on 16 December 1971, Lieutinant J.S. Aurora and General A.K.Niazi signed the Instrument of Surrender. India immediately announced an immediate and unilateral ceasefire on the Western front. After the humiliating defeat, Yahya Khan and the military handed over power in West Pakistan to Bhutto who became the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. On January 7 1972, Bhutto released Mujib who then flew to London and then to New Delhi to be received by Indira Gandhi on the tarmac. The post war conference in Shimla provided a way for India and Pakistan to solve their disputes in a bilateral fashion without external intervention and convert the ceasefire line in Kashmir (at that time) to a Line of Control that would in the future become an International border. In January 1972, the interim government of Bangladesh announced the creation of Genocide Investigation Commission and placed more than 37,000 individuals under arrest. In November 1973, Mujib announced a general amnesty for all prisoners with the exception of those charged with heinous crimes (rape, arson, murder). On August 15 1975, Mujib and several of his family members were assassinated. A week later, high ranking senior leadership of Awami League was gunned down. The interim President of Bangladesh pardoned the killers and after some time, was deposed by Major Zia Ur Rahman. In 2013, Mujib's daughter, Sheikh Hasina put into motion the trial for all those charged with crimes against humanity in 1971 (most of whom were members of Jamaat-i-Islami). The leader of opposition is Khaleda Zia, the wife of Major Zia Ur Rahman.
The story of 1971 war is the story of Indira Gandhi coming of age as a world leader in her own right. In domestic politics, she crushed the old guard of Congress party who dismissed her as lightweight, only to see the entire Congress party remade in her image. Then, it was the turn of Pakistan and the US to dismiss her as a woman in so many colorful words. Even Indian generals who should have known better (General Manekshaw, Major General Jacob) puffed themselves up as the decision makers at her expense. In the end, she steered India through a perilous period, assisted by self-inflicted wounds of Yahya Khan and Bhutto. The accolades went to her head and within 5 years, she had promulgated the Emergency across India and arrested the same political leader, Jaya Prakash Narayan, who played an instrumental role in bringing the plight of Bengalis in East Pakistan to her attention earlier.
Other Books for Reference:
The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide by Gary J Bass
The Trial of Henry Kissinger - Chritstopher Hitchens
The Trials of Henry Kissinger - Eugene Jarecki
The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 - Edited by Sajit Gandhi - National Security Archives, George Washington University
No comments:
Post a Comment